Having deployed Vasiliy Safronchuk and General Ivan Pavlosky as advisors to Kabul to oversee and attempt to stabilise the political situation, Amin isolated Taraki by overthrowing pro-Taraki politicians in cabinet and retained his stance on the pace of reforms. This provided a critical turning point for the Soviet decision-making process and pushed the Kremlin to take firm action. With Amin as the sole ruler of Afghanistan he would continue his reforms at a radical pace, consequently proliferating domestic turmoil.
As the PDPA initiated their early reforms, which sought to bring ethnic equality to rural tribes; cancel debts incurred by small farmers; and abolish bridal dowries in [16] , conservative landowners and clergymen who opposed reforms united against the government as the National Salvation Front. PDPA rule decentralised under the autonomous rule of rebel groups and by September rebel formations were active in 25 out of 28 provinces, and controlled 17 of those provinces.
Ultimately, Soviet fears that a weakened PDPA would succumb to internal subversion by these groups, and result in an Islamist Afghan regime accentuated the perceived need for intervention. These concerns heightened as the Iranian Revolution overturned the Shah and resulted in an anti-American Islamist state ruled by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Hilali argue that Islamism instigated Soviets alarm of Islamist spillover into their Central Asian Republics, which would disenfranchise Soviet rule, [22] examination of Soviet archival material suggests otherwise.
Misgivings surrounding Soviet encirclement through external forces emerged after October as Soviet relations with Amin broke down. Once Amin overthrew Taraki, he engaged in a more balanced foreign policy whereby he engaged with America.
Ouimet rightly contends that this simply justified Soviet intervention. However, the triumph of the Iranian Revolution, and presence of American warships in the Persian Gulf and the consequent speculation over an American attack on Iran intensified threat of similar American counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan.
American encroachment — like Islamism — would geopolitically isolate the Soviet Union and would also foster a situation in which the American missiles would point up at the USSR as experienced with Turkey in the s. The Soviets calculated that by invading Afghanistan, they could safeguard their border from American encroachment and depose Amin to stabilise the deteriorating domestic situation in the country.
However, Islamism and Western Encroachment alone did not compel the Politburo to pursue action. KGB officers on the ground in Afghanistan heightened the perceived security threat that these two factors posed to the Soviets, thus fostering a feeling that full-scale invasion was needed. Since the s, the KGB had been active in Afghanistan, building a covert station there, making contact with local communists and becoming versed in Afghan politics.
Faced with resistance from the military bureaucracy that argued against intervention, thus influencing the Politburo against invading in March, the KGB staff played on Soviet security concerns to achieve their aims.
KGB reports exaggerated the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and consistently championed that the only plausible action was intervention. The trio feared that the failure to act would instead permit the emergence of a new regime that would ultimately encircle, and confront the Soviets with a hostile power on their Southern border. Rather, it heightened the security threat and necessitated invasion to safeguard the socialist model to protect Soviet borders from being confronted by adversaries.
Brezhnev was confident to pursue intervention, as it appeared to be the only effective way the USSR could both safeguard the PDPA from increasing threats and protect their own Southern border.
Brezhnev and Carter were still negotiating SALT II throughout [49] and it could have been seen as hypocritical for the Soviets to invade Afghanistan while simultaneously discussing limiting their armaments stockpiles. Characteristically, a sharp escalation of border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in May happened when the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization was holding a meeting of defense ministers in Dushanbe.
Gaddy In retrospect, the best opportunity for building a stable peace in Afghanistan was in greater regional engagement, but Russia has never supported its cooperation with Central Asia, and neighbors such as Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan tend to believe more in protective barriers rather than in cross-border ties.
The best Russian diplomats can hope for is to dissuade the shrewd leadership of the Taliban from launching cross-border attacks northwards, but a wave of refugees is expected. Beijing remains reluctant to commit resources proportional to its major stakes in regional stability, and its attempts to make the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation into a key vehicle for that purpose are perceived in Moscow as far-fetched.
In the former one, cooperation with the United States, centered on countering terrorist threats, was feasible and even desirable; in the latter, confrontation with the West is the dominant feature, so every opportunity to exploit a setback for U. The withdrawal of U. In the early s, Russia was up to the task of enforcing peace in Central Asia, and in the early s, it was ready to engage in cooperation with the United States in rebuilding Afghanistan; but presently, Moscow cannot square its hegemonic ambitions with depleted power resources.
Russia stresses it has no interest in sending troops to Afghanistan, and it is not hard to see why. It fought a bloody and, many would argue, pointless war there in the latter years of the Soviet Union in the s. What began as a invasion to prop up a friendly regime lasted nine years and cost the lives of 15, Soviet personnel. It became a massive burden on the crumbling Soviet economy. Many of those killed were teenage Soviet army conscripts, and the war drove home a realisation of just how little the Soviet authorities cared about their own people.
The war is widely thought to have hastened the end of the Soviet Union, at least in part, by stirring disillusionment with its rulers. The war ended with an ignominious military withdrawal in February Russia may have given the impression of being prepared for the Taliban's sweep to power, but some experts believe Moscow was taken by surprise as much as everyone else.
Others in Moscow are wary of what Taliban rule might bring. Andrei Kortunov, head of the Russian International Affairs Council think tank, believes they will struggle to control the entire country, especially the north, and that could threaten Russia and its neighbours. He also fears a sharp deterioration in the Afghan economy, which could in turn prompt further instability.
Afghanistan: Danger lies on Kabul road to freedom. Facebook moves to protect Afghan users' accounts. Image source, Reuters. They may want to fight their way home, but their immediate objective is survival and possibly, resistance to the Taliban.
Taliban told female employees at some banks to not return to their jobs, raising concerns over their future rights. By Mansur Mirovalev. Published On 16 Aug More from News. US journalist Danny Fenster jailed for 11 years in Myanmar.
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